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Are countries with unregulated capital flows more vulnerable to currency crises? Efforts to 
answer this question properly must control for “self selection” bias since countries with 
liberalized capital accounts may also have more sound economic policies and institutions that 
make them less likely to experience crises. We employ a matching and propensity score 
methodology to address this issue in a panel analysis of developing countries.  Our results 
suggest that, after controlling for sample selection bias, countries with liberalized capital 
accounts experience a lower likelihood of currency crises. That is, when two countries have the 
same likelihood of allowing free movement of capital (based on historical evidence and a very 
similar set of identical economic and political characteristics at a point in time)—and one 
country imposes controls and the other does not-- the country without controls has a lower 
likelihood of experiencing a currency crisis. This result is at odds with the conventional wisdom 
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those of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. Please address correspondence to Hutchison at hutch@ucsc.edu. 1.  Introduction 
The benefits and costs of liberalizing administrative and legal controls on international 
capital flows have been the subject of renewed debate in recent years. Some studies suggest that 
eliminating or reducing the extent of these types of controls and restrictions can lower the cost of 
capital, promote portfolio diversification and risk sharing, and/or reduce microeconomic 
distortions, thereby improving investment, productivity, and growth.
1 Nonetheless, supporters of 
capital controls argue that they can yield benefits by reducing country vulnerability to volatile 
capital flows and currency crises. Recent examples of emerging markets that liberalized their 
capital accounts and subsequently experienced currency crises in the 1990s are often cited to 
support this view.  For example, the crises of Mexico (1994-95) and of Asia (1997-98) are often 
attributed to premature liberalization of international capital flows.
2  
While there is an extensive empirical literature measuring the effects of capital account 
liberalization on particular economic variables—e.g. capital flows, interest differentials, 
inflation, and output—surprisingly little systemic work has been undertaken regarding its impact 
on exchange rate stability in developing countries. Several papers have investigated the 
experiences of capital controls and/or capital account liberalization for a few selected countries 
(e.g. Edison and Reinhart, 2001a, 2001b; Edwards, 1999; Gregorio et al, 2000), but we are aware 
of only one recent study (Glick and Hutchison, forthcoming) that investigates this for a broad set 
of developing and emerging market economies.  
In general, these studies find little effect of capital controls in averting currency crises, at 
least not without supporting economic policies. They typically have found capital controls to be 
ineffective, distortionary, and/or counterproductive in the sense of signaling inconsistent and 
poorly designed government policies that may induce capital flight (Bartolini and Drazen, 1997a, 
b; Glick and Hutchison, forthcoming). Specific examples supporting this view are 
commonplace—Malaysia experienced a currency crisis in late 1997, despite having re-imposed 
capital controls a year earlier; El Salvador experienced crises in 1986 and again in 1990 despite 
having controls, while not having a crisis when controls were liberalized in 1996-97; Kenya had 
six currency crises since 1975 despite having controls over most of this period; and so on. 
                                                 
1 While there is agreement that capital market integration is qualitatively beneficial over the long run, there is much 
debate about the magnitude of these benefits; e.g., see Gourinchis and Jeanne (2003).  
2 The appropriate pace of deregulation of domestic financial markets also has been of concern, even in many 
industrial countries. The United States, Japan, and Sweden, among others, all have experienced some domestic 
financial instability following deregulation of domestic financial institutions.  
  1Dooley (1996), summarizing the literature, concludes: “Capital controls or dual exchange rate 
systems have been effective in generating yield differentials, covered for exchange rate risk, for 
short periods of time, but they have little power to stop speculative attacks on regimes that were 
seen by the market as inconsistent” (p. 677).   
One possible explanation of why liberalized capital accounts may be associated with 
lower vulnerability to currency crises concerns the special characteristics and “self selection” of 
countries that choose to liberalize their capital accounts. Countries with macroeconomic 
imbalances, financial weaknesses, political instability, and/or institutional problems may choose 
to retain capital controls in order to avoid difficult economic reforms or to avoid capital outflows 
that may trigger a crisis. Conversely, countries with sound macroeconomic and political 
environments and more robust financial systems and institutions are not only less likely to 
experience crises, but also may be less likely to enact capital controls and forego the benefits of 
free capital flows. Consequently, countries with open capital accounts may be less prone to 
financial crises, both domestic and international in origin. Although capital controls may reduce 
country vulnerability to crises in some cases, capital account liberalization can still be associated 
with a lower overall likelihood of financial crises.  
A particular source of concern for empirical analysis is that the policy choice to establish 
or maintain an environment with a liberalized capital account may be correlated with 
macroeconomic, financial, and institutional policy variables that in turn lower the likelihood of 
currency crises. If so, estimation of the likelihood of crises may yield a biased measure of the 
effect of capital controls because of sample selection bias, i.e. systematic differences between 
countries that do and do not liberalize the capital account.
3  
In light of the sample selection bias inherent in the group of countries that maintain a 
liberalized capital account-- and the fact that studies to date have not addressed this issue—can 
we put much faith in the empirical finding that free movement of capital reduces a country’s 
vulnerability to currency crises? We address this issue by employing the matching and 
propensity score methodology that was developed precisely for the sample selection bias 
associated with this type of estimation problem.  In particular, the method of matching was 
                                                 
 
3 Glick and Hutchison (forthcoming) control for a host of economic, political, and institutional factors usually 
associated with currency instability and capital controls. They also develop an empirical model of the factors 
explaining governments’ decisions to maintain capital controls, jointly explaining this decision with the onset of 
currency attacks through bivariate probit estimation . However, they do not formally address the issue of sample 
selection bias. 
  2developed to help account for the estimation bias arising from the “selection on observables” 
problem, which to date has mainly been applied in the medical and labor economics literature.
4 
The basic idea is straightforward. Each participation observation is matched to a non-
participation observation that has the same observed values of a vector of other characteristics 
that determine participation. Under certain standard assumptions, the difference in the observed 
outcome between the two matched observations is thus the program’s effect. As Heckman et al. 
(1997) state: “…simple balancing of observables in the participant and comparison group 
samples goes a long way toward producing a more effective evaluation strategy” (p. 607).  
This paper evaluates the effect of an environment with liberalized capital flows on the 
likelihood of currency crises using several recently developed matching methods designed to 
deal with sample selection bias. In particular, we use “nearest neighbor”, “radius,” and 
“stratification” matching methods, as well as a “regression-adjusted” matching estimator 
suggested by Heckman et al. (1997)—all methods designed to account for selection on 
observables bias. This work suggests that, even after controlling for sample selection bias (and 
obtaining unbiased estimates), a liberalized capital account is associated with a lower likelihood 
of currency crises. That is, when two countries have the same likelihood of allowing free 
movement of capital (based on historical evidence and a very similar set of identical economic 
and political characteristics at a point in time)—and one country imposes controls and the other 
does not-- the country without controls has a lower likelihood of experiencing a currency crisis.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the matching methodology in 
more detail and its application to the problem at hand. Section 3 discusses construction of the 
key variables in our analysis – measures of currency crises and of capital account liberalization – 
and gives descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents empirical results concerning calculation of the 
propensity scores used in creating the matched samples as well as estimation of the probability of 
currency crisis equations used in regression-adjusted matching methods.  Section 5 presents the 
main results of the paper measuring the effect of capital account liberalization on currency crises 
while controlling for selection bias. Section 6 concludes the paper and draws policy implications.   
                                                 
4 The selection bias problem typically addressed in the medical and health care literature arises when the patients 
with worse health problems seek out the better doctors and facilities. In assessing treatment effectiveness, matching 
methods are employed to control for the downward bias associated with the lower survival rates of these patients.     
Persson (2001) and Hutchison (2004) are exceptions in the macroeconomics literature by applying the matching 
methodology to investigations of, respectively, the effect of currency unions on trade growth and the effect of IMF 
program participation on output growth. 
  3 
2.  Matching Methodology 
The advantage of matching methods is that they address the problem of non-random 
sample selection and, as a non-parametric statistical method, avoid strong assumptions about 
functional form
5. To examine the effect of capital account liberalization on the occurrence of 
currency crises we employ three matching algorithms—nearest neighbor, stratification, and 
radius matching—These different approaches all match observations with similar 
characteristics, excepting that one group of countries liberalizes capital controls (the “treatment 
group”) and the other does not (the “control group”). Following the matching of observations, we 
assess the “treatment effect” by measuring the difference in the frequency of currency crises 
between the two groups.  
In order to assess similarity among countries and construct the samples of countries with 
and without liberalized capital accounts (the “participation” and “non-participation”  
observations, respectively), we consider a set of observable country characteristics. One 
approach is to match each participation observation with a non-participation observation that has 
exactly the same observed values of a vector of other characteristics that determine participation 
(X). In macroeconomic studies, where the size of the sample is typically limited, this matching 
method is difficult or impossible to implement. Fortunately, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983 and 
1985) have shown that, if the probability of participation – P(X) – is known, then matching by 
P(X) instead of X is sufficient. This collapses the multidimensional problem of matching to one 
dimension based on the estimated probabilities or propensity scores and greatly simplifies the 
procedure. Rubin and Thomas (1992) show that using an estimated probability of participation 
(X) based on the set of observable characteristics, instead of P(X), still reduces selection-on-
observables bias. When two countries have a similar propensity score, they are paired according 
to one of the following three matching criteria.  
P 
The nearest neighbor approach matches each participation observation to the non-
participation observation that has the nearest propensity score. After each non-participation 
observation is used, it is “returned” to the pool of non-participation observations. The treatment 
effect is computed as a simple average of the differences in outcomes across the paired matches.  
The radius approach matches each participation observation to the average of all the non-
                                                 
5 See Persson (2001) for an excellent review of matching methodology and an application with macroeconomic data. 
  4participation observations with propensity scores falling within a pre-specified radius from the 
propensity score of the participation observation
6. In this case, the treatment effect is again 
computed as an average of the difference in outcomes, but with weighting according to the 
number of non-participation observations used in the construction of each matched pair. The 
stratification approach divides the sample into several groups, or strata, based on their propensity 
scores. Within each stratum, the average of the participation observations is matched with the 
average of the non-participation observations. An average of the strata, weighted by the number 
of participation observations in each one, is then calculated to create the treatment effect. In all 
three cases, weighted standard errors are constructed as described in the appendix of Persson 
(2001).
7
Following Rubin (1979) and Heckman et al. (1997, 1998), we also implement regression-
adjusted variants of our matching estimators. While the aforementioned matching methodologies 
do not impose any structure on the currency crisis equation, biases can result from omitted 
variables that are correlated with both the outcome (the occurrence of currency crises) and the 
treatment (liberalization of capital controls). Both consistency and efficiency may be improved 
by implementing a regression-adjusted estimator. Rubin (1979) suggests that the outcome 
regression should contain all available observations, while Heckman et al. (1997) conclude that 
estimation using only the non-participation observations (i.e., those with capital controls, in our 
case) is preferable. We employ the method of Heckman et al. (1997). The residuals from this 
regression are then used in our three matching methods. 
 
3.  Data Construction and Descriptive Statistics 
3a. Defining Currency Crises 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the effect of capital account liberalization on the 
incidence of currency crises for a panel of developing countries. We include developing 
countries that both did and did not experience a severe currency crisis/speculative attack during 
                                                 
6 More specifically, for radius of magnitude r, each participation observation with an estimated propensity score ñ is 
matched with all the non-participation observations whose propensity scores (q) satisfy the condition ñ-r<q<ñ+r. 
Following Persson (2001), we use a value of r=.05 as our benchmark value. 
7 The nearest neighbor and radius approaches are each implemented in Dehejia and Wahba (2002), who also employ 
a version of the stratification method to estimate propensity scores. All three methods are implemented in Persson 
(2001). 
 
  5the 1975-97 sample period. Using such a broad control group allows us to make inferences about 
the conditions and characteristics distinguishing countries encountering crises and others 
managing to avoid crises. The minimum data requirements to be included in our study are that 
GDP are available for a minimum of 10 consecutive years over the period 1975-97. This 
requirement results in a sample of 69 developing countries. 
To identify currency crises we construct a measure of monthly exchange rate pressure 
and date each by the year in which it occurs. Specifically, currency crises are defined as “large” 
changes in a monthly index of currency pressure, measured as a weighted average of monthly 
real exchange rate changes
8 and monthly (percent) reserve losses.
9 Following convention (e.g. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), the weights attached to the exchange rate and reservation 
components of the currency pressure index are inversely related to the variance of changes of 
each component over the sample for each country.
10 The exchange rate and reserve data are 
drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (lines 
ae and 11.d, respectively). 
Our measure presumes that any nominal currency changes associated with the exchange 
rate pressure should affect the purchasing power of the domestic currency, i.e. result in a change 
in the real exchange rate (at least in the short run). This condition excludes some large 
depreciations that occur during high inflation episodes, but it avoids screening out sizable 
depreciation events in more moderate inflation periods for countries that have occasionally 
experienced periods of hyperinflation and extreme devaluation.
11 Large changes in exchange rate 
                                                 
8 Real exchange rate changes are defined in terms of the trade-weighted sum of bilateral real exchange rates 
(constructed in terms of CPI indices, line 64 of the IFS) against the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the Japanese 
yen, where the trade-weights are based on the average of bilateral trade with the United States, the European Union, 
and Japan in 1980 and 1990 (from the IMF’s Direction of Trade).  Most panel studies of currency crises define the 
currency pressure measure in terms of the bilateral exchange rate against a single foreign currency.  For example, 
Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) measure the real exchange rate for all 
of the developing countries in their sample against the U.S. dollar.  In defining the effective rate in terms of the three 
major nations likely to be main trading partners of most developing countries, our approach provides a broader 
measure than these other studies and is computationally easier to construct than a multilateral exchange rate measure 
defined in terms of all of a country’s trading partners. 
9 Ideally, reserve changes should be scaled by the level of the monetary base or some other money aggregate, but 
such data is not generally available on a monthly basis for most countries. 
10 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defense involving sharp rises in interest 
rates.  Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of the sample period in many of the 
developing countries in our dataset. 
11 This approach differs from that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, who deal with episodes of 
hyperinflation by separating the nominal exchange rate depreciation observations for each country according to 
whether or not inflation in the previous 6 months was greater than 150 percent, and they calculate for each sub-
sample separate standard deviation and mean estimates with which to define exchange rate crisis episodes. 
  6pressure are defined as changes in our pressure index that exceed the mean plus 2 times the 
country-specific standard deviation, provided that it also exceeds 5 percent.
12 The first condition 
insures that any large (real) depreciation is counted as a currency crisis, while the second 
condition attempts to screen out changes that are insufficiently large in an economic sense 
relative to the country-specific monthly change of the exchange rate. 
For each country-year in our sample, we construct a binary measure of currency crises, as 
defined above (1 = crisis, 0. = no crisis). A currency crisis is deemed to have occurred for a 
given year if the change in currency pressure for any month of that year satisfies our criteria (i.e. 
two standard deviations above the mean as well as greater than five percent in magnitude). To 
reduce the chances of capturing the continuation of the same currency crisis episode, we impose 
windows on our data. In particular, after identifying each “large” monthly change in currency 
pressure, we treat any large changes in the following 24-month window as part of the same 
currency episode and skip the years of that change before continuing the identification of new 
crises. With this methodology, we identify 160 currency crises over the 1975-97 period.  
Appendix C lists the countries included in the sample and corresponding currency crisis dates, if 
any. 
 
3b. Measuring Liberalization of Restrictions on International Payments 
The underlying source for our measures of capital account liberalization are data on 
external restrictions in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (EAER). A country is classified as either “liberalized  (value of unity) or “restricted 
(value of zero) depending on the existence of controls on the capital account at year-end. 
Specifically, for the 1975–94 period the EAER coded countries (published in the reports through 
1995) for the existence (or not) of “restrictions on payments for capital transactions.” From 1996, 
the EAER (starting with the 1997 Annual Report) reported 10 separate categories for controls on 
capital transactions (11 categories in the 1998 Annual Report). We defined the capital account to 
be restricted for the 1996-97 observations (i.e. not liberalized) if controls were in place in 5 or 
                                                 
12 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a three standard deviation cut-off. While the choice of cut-off point is 
somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) suggest that the results are not very sensitive to the precise cut-off 
chosen in selecting crisis episodes. 
 
  7more of the EAER sub-categories of capital account restrictions and “financial credit” was one of 
the categories restricted.
13  
We are aware of concerns about the quality of the IMF data on capital account 
liberalization. By providing only a dichotomous indication of the existence of administrative 
controls, they are limited in their ability to measure the extent to which restrictions are applied 
and enforced over time and across countries. Nor do they clearly distinguish between restrictions 
on capital inflows and outflows.  However, the IMF measures are the only source of data 
available that can be collected with some consistency across a broad group of developing 
countries and over a reasonably long period of time. This is a constraint faced by any panel study 
in this literature.
 14  Glick and Hutchison (forthcoming) consider alternative balance of payment 
restriction indicators, including controls on export receipts or current account transactions, as 
well as domestic financial controls.  They find that while these alternative measures differ 
somewhat in indicating the presence of controls for individual countries, their results were not 
sensitive to the particular measure used: countries without restrictions, however measured, were 
always less prone to currency crises. 
 
3c. Descriptive Statistics on Currency Crises and Capital Account Liberalization 
Table 1 shows the frequency of country-years with currency crises and capital account 
liberalization over the 1975–97 period, and by 5-year intervals (except for the 1995–97 sub-
sample). The table reports the unconditional frequency of currency crises and liberalization 
observations (i.e., the number of “crisis” or “liberalization in place” observations, divided by the 
total number of observations).  
The 69 developing countries in our dataset experienced 160 currency crises over the 
1975–97 period, implying a frequency of 11.7 percent of the available country-year observations. 
Crises were least frequent during the 1975–79 period (9.9 percent average frequency) and most 
frequent during the 1985–89 period (14.3 percent frequency). The frequency of crises in the most 
period of our sample, 1995-97, was only 9.7 percent.  Thus, in our sample, the spate of currency 
                                                 
13 The 11 classifications under capital restrictions reported in the 1998 EAER were controls on: (1) capital market 
securities, (2) money market instruments, (3) collective investment securities, (4) derivatives and other instruments, 
(5) commercial credits, (6) financial credits, (7) guarantees, sureties, and financial backup facilities, (8) direct 
investment, (9) liquidation of direct investment, (10) real estate transactions, and (11) personal capital movements. 
14 See Edison et al (2002) for a comparison of different measures of capital controls in the context of an analysis of 
the effects of capital account liberalization on long-run economic growth. 
  8crises around the world in the latter half of the 1990s does not indicate a rise in the frequency of 
currency crises over time.
15
Table 1 also reports the frequency with which liberalized capital accounts were in place 
during the period.  Liberalized capital flows were relatively infrequent, accounting for only 16.2  
percent of the observations. Although this frequency was always low during the sample period, it 
fell noticeably from 1975 through 1989, before rising n the 1990s. The low point was an average 
frequency of 11.0 percent during 1985–89, and the high point was 23.8 percent during 1995-97.  
 
3d. Currency Crisis Frequencies Conditional on Capital Account Liberalization 
Table 2 shows the frequency of currency crises conditional upon a country’s having 
liberalized capital flows. This table sheds light directly upon the main question of interest: 
whether liberalization of capital flows affects the probability of a currency crisis. To take 
account of the possibility that controls are implemented in response to a crisis, we report results 
conditional on the absence of controls at the end of the year prior to a crisis as well as at the end 
of the year in which a crisis occurs.   statistics for tests of the null hypothesis of independence 
between the frequency of crises and whether liberalization was in place are also presented. 
2 χ
The most striking result from Table 2 is that the country-year observations associated 
with less restrictions on capital flows have substantially lower frequencies of currency crises 
than those observations where controls were in place. Specifically, countries with liberalized 
capital flows had crises contemporaneously 6.8 percent of the time, compared to 12.7 percent for 
those with restrictions. The  statistics reject the null of independence and indicate that this 
difference is significant (at better than 5 percent). The difference in currency crisis frequency 
according to whether the capital account was liberalized or not in the preceding year is smaller 
(8.0 percent versus 12.5 percent), but is still significant at the 10 percent level. This is suggestive 
prima facie evidence that controls may not be effective and, indeed, may increase the likelihood 
of a currency crisis (e.g. Bartolini and Drazen, 1997a). It suggests that the presence of capital 
controls does not reduce a country’s exposure to currency instability. 
2 χ
 
                                                 
15 Currency crises were most frequent in Africa (16.2 percent frequency), and least frequent in Asia (9.6 percent). 
Despite recent high profile currency crises in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Korea, the developing economies 
in Asia have been less frequently affected by currency instability. 
 
  94.  Preliminaries: Estimating Propensity Score and Currency Crisis Equations 
4a. Propensity Scores 
In controlling for sample selection bias, a benchmark probit equation explaining the 
likelihood of a country having a liberalized capital account is estimated to calculate propensity 
scores. We consider a number of potential structural, political, and economic determinants of 
capital account liberalization. The selection of these potential variables is guided by previous 
literature in this area. Alesina, Grilli, Milesi-Ferretti (1994), Bartolini and Drazen, (1997a, b), 
Glick and Hutchison (forthcoming) and Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995), for example, present 
empirical results on a number of possible determinants of capital controls (and/or capital account 
liberalization). They find countries with a higher level of government expenditure, relatively 
closed to international trade, and with large current account deficits are more likely to restrict 
capital flows. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) also report evidence that political instability is 
associated with fewer capital account restrictions in developing economies. Bartolini and Drazen 
(1997b) link a high degree of restrictions on international payments in developing economies 
with high world real interest rates—measured as the weighted real interest rate in the G-7 
industrial countries—in a yearly time-series regression. They view the causality as running from 
world interest rates to capital restrictions: restrictions are removed when the cost of doing so is 
low, i.e. only a small outflow of capital is expected when world interest are low. Edwards 
(1989), investigating the experiences of twenty countries over the 1961-82 period, finds that 
capital controls are frequently intensified in the year prior to the onset of a currency crisis. This 
suggests that a common set of factors may contribute both to the onset of a currency crisis and 
lead governments to impose or maintain capital account restrictions, or conversely liberalize 
their capital accounts.  
Following these studies, we include two macroeconomic variables, two economic 
structure variables, and two political variables in our benchmark probit selection equation. The 
macroeconomic variables are the current account (as a percent of GDP) and the level of 
“Northern” real interest rates (proxied by the level of the U.S. real long-term interest rate). The 
economic structure factors considered are the relative size of government spending and openness 
to world trade (measured by the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP).  These 
macroeconomic data series are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS CD-ROM.  
  10The two political explanatory variables included in our model are the total changes in 
government and a measure of political freedom.
16   
In addition to these variables, we also estimate an augmented probit selection equation 
that includes two additional variables – the previous history (i.e., the lagged occurrence) of 
currency crises and of capital account liberalization. We choose to be selective in not adding 
more variables, however, following the observation of Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) 
that adding more observables other than the determinants of the selection equation may not help 
reduce bias of the treatment effect estimator, especially when information is lacking on the 
correlation between the unobservables from the selection equation and those from the currency 
crisis equation.  
Appendix A presents our two probit models used to predict the likelihood of capital 
account liberalization.  In the benchmark specification reported in column (1), larger current 
account surpluses, greater trade openness, higher world interest rates, frequent changes in 
governments, and more economic freedom are associated with a higher  likelihood that capital 
account liberalization is in place. Higher levels of government spending are associated with a 
lower likelihood of liberalization. All coefficient signs, except for that on the interest rate, are 
consistent with priors.  
Column (2) reports the augmented specification, with dummies for the occurrence of a 
currency crisis in the preceding year and for the presence of capital account liberalization in the 
preceding year included as explanatory variables. A currency crisis in the previous year has a 
negative effect on the likelihood of liberalization in the current year, though the effect is 
insignificant. The presence of liberalized capital controls in the preceding year significantly 
raises the likelihood of liberalization in the current year. The inclusion of lagged capital 
liberalization in the equation reduces the significance level of some explanatory variables 
(current account, U.S. real interest rate, changes in government, freedom). This suggests that the 
capital liberalization in place is the best indicator of future capital liberalization, with the other 
explanatory variables playing a secondary role. The importance of lagged dependent variables in 
                                                 
16 The total number of democratic and undemocratic (e.g. coups) changes in government over the period 1970-97 
was determined from Zarate’s Political Collections website (www.terra.es/personal2/monolith), supplemented by 
information from the Encarta Encyclopedia website (www.encarta.msn.com). The political freedom measure is 
taken from the Freedom House website (www.freedomhoouse.com); the variable is measured on a 0-3 scale, with 
“0” indicating the highest level of freedom. 
  11models of this nature, however, begs the question of what are the fundamental factors that lead 
governments to impose or remove capital controls. 
Both probit specifications predict the presence of capital controls very well, calling 98 
percent of these observations correctly. However, the augmented model is much better at 
predicting observations with liberalization in place (90 percent are called correctly, compared to 
11 percent for the benchmark model. Correspondingly, the pseudo-R2 of the augmented model is 
better as well (.77, compared to 0.20 for the benchmark model). It should not be surprising that 
lagged liberalization is a very good predictor of future liberalization, since the switch from a 
liberalized capital flows to a regime with capital controls and vice versa is not a common 
occurrence in the sample.  
Table 3 shows summary statistics (mean values and standard errors) for economic and 
political variables in the treatment group (171 country-year observations with capital account 
liberalization in place) and the unmatched control group (822 observations with capital controls). 
We also present summary statistics for two alternative control groups—observations matched 
(using propensity scores derived from the probit equation explaining capital controls) by either 
the nearest neighbor method or the radius measure (with a radius magnitude of 0.05). 
It is noteworthy that the mean values of the current account balance and government 
spending are lower, and trade openness is larger for the treatment group than in any of the 
control groups, implying economic fundamentals are better on average in countries with 
liberalized capital accounts. The U.S. interest rate is lower for the treatment group (with the 
exception of the nearest neighbor control group), suggesting that these countries benefited from 
the lesser attractiveness of  investment opportunities in industrial economies. There are 
meaningful differences as well in the mean values of the political variables: governments change 
more often and the degree of political freedom is greater (since a lower index value implies 
greater freedom) in the treatment group. 
Table 3 also reports that there is almost a 10 percentage point difference between the 
predicted likelihood (i.e., mean propensity) of the treatment group having liberalized capital 
accounts and that of the unmatched control group (0.295 versus 0.196). This is not surprising 
since by construction all observations in the treatment group have liberalized their capital 
accounts, while none of the observations in the control group have done so.  Compared to the 
unmatched control group, the predicted likelihood of liberalized capital accounts is slightly 
  12higher for the two matched control groups -- 0.227 for the nearest neighbor procedure and 0.196 
for the radius procedure, but still well below the mean of the treatment group (0.295).   
Some examples of country/time observations with similar propensity scores, but different 
treatments and outcomes, may be informative in pointing out both the strengths and weaknesses 
of the matching methodology.  These examples were “matches” using the nearest neighbor 
approach: (1) Bolivia had no capital controls in 1977 and an estimated probability (propensity 
score) of capital account liberalization of 0.400. Bolivia did not experience a crisis in that year.  
Thailand had a similar propensity score (0.396) in 1981, but did have capital controls in place 
and did experience a currency crisis. (2) Malaysia had a liberalized capital account in 1986, and a 
propensity score of 0.235. Malaysia experienced a currency crisis. India did have capital controls 
in 1995, but had an identical score (0.235)—and also experienced a currency crisis in that year. 
(3) Guatemala had a liberalized capital account in 1989 and a propensity score of 0.414, but 
experienced a currency crisis. Swaziland in 1991 had capital controls and an identical propensity 
score, but did not experience a currency crisis at that time.  
These examples illustrate the fact that country experiences vary greatly across time, and 
the matching (nearest neighbor) procedure will pick out the observations with the closest 
likelihood of a liberalized capital account. As we shall show, the model when estimated across 
time and countries has good explanatory power and predictive characteristics. Nonetheless, at 
each point in time the conditions associated with (or without) a currency crisis in a particular 
country may differ greatly. (This is addressed in the regression-adjusted matching procedures 
below where a model of currency crises is employed). Moreover, there are many examples of 
matched observations of countries with and without capital controls associated with “low” as 
well as “high” propensity scores. For example, Indonesia had a liberalized capital account in 
1983 but a relatively low propensity score (0.120); Ethiopia had capital controls in 1983 and an 
identical propensity score in 1983. But Ethiopia avoided a currency crisis, while Indonesia did 
not. 
  
4b. Currency Crisis Equations 
In order to generate Heckman et al.’s (1997, 1998) regression-adjusted matching 
estimators, it is necessary to specify an equation that controls for the factors—other than capital 
account liberalization—that may influence the occurrence of currency crises. We follow Glick 
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equation. Their basic model includes five macroeconomic control variables (all are lagged to 
limit simultaneity problems). These variables are the log ratio of broad money to foreign 
reserves, domestic credit growth, the current account to GDP ratio, real GDP growth, and real 
exchange rate overvaluation
17.  Unlike their work (based on a locally linear regression 
technique), however, we use a linear probability model since Heckman et al. is essentially a two-
stage estimation procedure where the first stage generates residuals to be used as the “outcome 
variable” in the second-stage matching test. The residuals from the linear probability model of 
currency crises may be interpreted in an intuitive way, with positive (negative) residuals 
associated with currency crises (periods of tranquility) that were unexpected based on the set of 
explanatory variables that are statistically good predictors of currency crises (periods of 
tranquility).  
The first stage of the Heckman et al. method is based on a regression using the sample 
restricted to the control group, i.e. the (751) observations with capital controls. These results are 
reported in Appendix B. As expected, the M2/foreign reserves ratio and domestic credit growth 
are positively associated with currency crises.  Current account surpluses, real overvaluation, and 
strong real GDP growth are associated with a lower frequency of currency crises. Although the 
explanatory variables all have the expected signs, we note that the regression explains only a 
small percentage of currency crisis occurrences (5 percent).  
 
5.  Impact of Capital Account Liberalization on Currency Crises 
5a.  Unconditional Matching Results 
We first estimate propensity scores from the benchmark selection equation and then 
employ nearest neighbor, radius, and strata matching methods to evaluate the impact of capital 
account liberalization on the frequency of currency crises. We term these results “unconditional 
matching” since we compare the unconditional frequency of currency crises for observations 
without capital controls imposed with the matched set of observations with capital controls in 
                                                 
17 The data are drawn from the IMF IFS CD-ROM: log ratio of broad money to foreign reserves (lines 34 plus 35 
divided by 1ld times ae), domestic credit growth (line 32), the current account to GDP ratio (line 78ald times xrrf 
divided by 99b) real GDP growth (line 99b.r or 99b.p), and real exchange rate overvaluation. The latter variable is 
constructed as the degree of real exchange rate overvaluation from deviations from a fitted trend in the real trade-
weighted exchange rate index, where the exchange rate index we fit is the annual average of the monthly series used 
in constructing the exchange rate component of our currency pressure index.  
  14place. Table 4 shows that the frequency of currency crises is significantly lower in countries with 
liberalized capital accounts than in the matched samples with capital controls; this result is 
invariant to the matching method employed. Specifically, the frequency of currency crises in 
countries with liberalized capital accounts, compared to those with capital controls, ranges from 
4.84 percent lower with the radius method to 7.60 percent lower with the nearest neighbor 
method. These results are statistically (at the 5 percent level) and economically significant.  
Table 5 undertakes two robustness checks using he unconditional matching procedure. 
The results from the analysis reported in Table 4 do not impose any restrictions that require 
matches are from different countries. In Table 5 we consider the possibility of correlation among 
observations from the same country—a potential source of estimation bias-- and impose the 
restriction that the match(es) for each observation in the treatment group are always drawn from 
a different country in the control group. We report the results of unconditional matching with this 
restriction for both the nearest neighbor and radius measures. We also consider as a robustness 
check the “tighter” radius parameter of 0.01 (as compared with the benchmark value of 0.05). 
This is a potentially important robustness check since the propensity scores are grouped rather 
tightly in the sample. A tighter radius parameter serves to give a control group that more closely 
reflects—in terms of similarity of observed characteristics-- the matched treatment observation.  
The results are generally unaffected in terms of point estimates, with the frequency of 
currency crises ranging from 5 to 7 percent lower for countries without capital controls; 
however, the significance levels are noticeably higher for the radius measure results, particularly 
with the tighter radius parameter, with both significant at better than 1 percent. The negative 
treatment effects of liberalized capital accounts reported in both Table 4 and Table 5 suggest that 
countries with liberalized capital accounts are much less likely to experience a currency crisis. 
This impact is statistically significant for all matching methods.  
 
5b.  Regression-adjusted Matching Results 
The regression-adjusted matching method controls for factors other than capital account 
liberalization that may affect the likelihood of currency crises. As described in Section 4, we 
implement this approach by estimating currency crisis prediction equations (reported in 
Appendix A) for the sample of observations with capital controls, in accordance with the 
approach of  Heckman et al. (1997).  We then take the residuals (“unexplained currency crises”) 
  15from the currency crisis equation and compare them for observations without and with capital 
restrictions, where the latter are constructed using our three matching method.  
The results in Table 6 confirm the implications from our other matching methods: 
countries with less restrictive capital controls tend to be less vulnerable to speculative attacks.  In 
fact, the results indicate that the estimated effect of liberalized capital accounts is dramatically 
stronger in terms of magnitude (i.e. more negative) and significance (all the results are 
significant at better than 1 percent).  The frequency of currency crises is 15 percent lower in 
countries without capital controls than those with controls for the radius and strata matching 
methods, and 22 percent lower for the nearest-neighbor method. Thus conditioning our matches 
on the determinants of currency crises gives larger and more precise estimates of the effects of 
capital account liberalization.   
 
5c. Robustness to Alternative Propensity Score Equations 
Table 7 presents robustness tests using alternative propensity scores derived from our  
augmented probit model of capital account liberalization that includes lagged currency crises as 
well as lagged liberalization (shown in column 2 of Appendix Table A). As noted earlier, 
inclusion of the lagged capital liberalization measure increases the explanatory power of the 
selection model markedly—increasing the pseudo R2 from 0.20 to 0.77—because the switch 
from a regime with controls to one with free movement of capital (and vice versa) is relatively 
infrequent, i.e. being in a regime of liberalized capital flows is a very good predictor continuing 
in that regime in the following year. This alternative estimation equation for propensity scores 
gives much higher predictive power and better captures the dynamics of the system.  
The results reported in Table 7 are much stronger than the benchmark unconditional 
matching results reported in Table 4, and similar in magnitude to the regression-adjusted 
matching results reported in Table 6. Specifically, the frequency of currency crises is 18 to 26 
percent less in countries that have liberalized their capital accounts, much larger in magnitude 
than the 5 to 7 percent difference for the benchmark cases (and are comparable to the regression-
adjusted results in Table 6).  In addition, the results are more precisely estimated, with the 
statistical significance exceeding 1 percent with the nearest neighbor method (with a t-statistic of 
6.1) and 5 percent for both the radius and strata methods (with t statistics of 2.25 and 2.14, 
respectively).  
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7.  Conclusion Remarks 
Whether countries that allow international capital to flow freely— without substantial 
administrative controls on international payments—subject themselves to greater risk of currency 
and balance of payments turmoil is an important but unresolved policy issue. A theoretical 
literature, and countless policy experiences, suggests that countries with liberalized capital 
accounts may or may not be more susceptible to crises depending on a host of economic, 
administrative and political factors. The empirical literature in this area is similarly mixed in 
terms of providing evidence both for and against the vulnerability of countries with liberalized 
capital flows. Unfortunately, this literature is not very helpful to economic policymakers seeking 
practical benchmarks in guiding their decisions on whether to liberalize capital accounts.  
We argue that more attention needs to focus on the environment in which countries 
liberalize their capital accounts— freedom of international capital movements may be associated 
with less vulnerability to currency crises in large part due to the special characteristics and “self 
selection” of countries that choose to liberalize. Countries with relatively balanced 
macroeconomic policies, strong financial sectors, political stability, and/or institutional stability 
may choose to liberalize their capital accounts because they want to take advantage of long-run 
efficiency gains in the allocation of capital and are not overly concerned with external crises. By 
contrast, countries with capital controls may hope to avoid difficult economic reforms or to avoid 
capital outflows that may trigger a crisis. This implies that countries with sound macroeconomic 
and political environments and more robust financial systems and institutions may not only be 
less likely to experience crises, but also less likely to enact capital controls and forego the 
benefits of free capital flows. Consequently, countries with closed capital accounts may be more 
prone to financial crises, both domestic and international in origin. Although capital account 
liberalization may increase country vulnerability to crises in some cases, capital controls can still 
be associated with a greater overall likelihood of financial crises.  
We address this issue by employing the matching and propensity score methodology that 
was developed precisely for this type of sample selection bias. Methods of matching were 
developed to help account for the estimation bias arising from the “selection on observables” 
problem. We use “nearest neighbor”, “radius,” and “stratification” matching methods, as well as 
a “regression-adjusted” matching estimator—all methods designed to account for selection on 
  17observables bias. To our knowledge, none of these methods have been applied to the problem at 
hand.  
All of our results suggest that, even after controlling for sample selection bias (and 
obtaining unbiased estimates), capital restrictions are associated with a greater likelihood of 
currency crises. That is, when two countries have the same likelihood of maintaining a 
liberalized capital account (based on historical evidence and a very similar set of identical 
economic and political characteristics at a point in time)—and one country imposes controls and 
the other does not-- the country without controls has a lower likelihood of experiencing a 
currency crisis. These results are robust to changes in the type of methodology or changes in the 
equations that predict the likelihood of capital account liberalization.  The point estimates 
suggest that countries without capital controls are from 5-7 percent to as much as 18 -26 percent 
less likely to experience a currency crisis in any given year.  
The link between crises and capital controls is robust to our methodological correction 
for sample selection bias— the propensity score/matching method applied in this study—a clear 
problem in estimating models concerning the application of capital controls and whether they are 
useful “medicine” for warding off currency crises. This improvement in methodological 
approach provides a much stronger empirical foundation for earlier empirical findings. 
Moreover, the upper end of our range of magnitudes obtained with matching methodology 
suggests that earlier work may have underestimated the positive benefits of liberalization for 
macroeconomic stability. Indeed, these results support previous work finding a negative 
(positive) link between capital account liberalization (controls) and the onset of currency crises 
but are much larger in magnitude. The estimates reported here, using matching methods, suggest 
that previous studies may have greatly underestimated—perhaps as much as a factor of five-- the 
reduced likelihood of a currency crisis in an environment with liberalized capital flows. Rather 
than weakening the observed negative correlation between liberalized international payments and 
the likelihood of currency instability—the premise that motivated this article—the application of 
a rigorous methodology for sample selection bias has made it even clearer that countries with 
liberalized capital flows are more likely to have stable external economies and avoid currency 
crises.  
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Currency Crises and Capital Account Liberalization, 















a 11.7 9.9  12 14.3  11.8 9.7 
(Number of crises)
  (160)  (26) (34) (43) (38) (19) 
Liberalization
b 16.2 20.6 15.8 11.0 13.4 23.8 
 
a  Number of crises divided by total country-years with available data. Number of crises is in parentheses. 








Currency Crises, Frequency Conditional on Capital Account Liberalization (in percent) 
 
 




Liberalization in place during 
current year?  6.8  12.7  6.11** 
Liberalization in place during 
previous year?  8.0  12.5  3.50* 
 
a  Number of currency crises for which capital account liberalization in place at end of current or previous year, 
divided by total number of country-years with liberalization in place. 
b  Number of currency crises for which capital account liberalization in place at end of current or previous year, 
divided by total number of country-years with liberalization in place. 
c  Null hypothesis of independence between frequency of currency crises and capital account liberalization is 
distributed as χ
2(1). Note: ** and * indicate rejection of null at 5 and 10 percent significance levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 
Sample Characteristics of Treatment and Control Groups 
 
















































































observations  171 822 128 821 
 
Note: the table reports the sample means of variables (with associated standard errors in parenthesis) of the 
treatment group, i.e. country-years with liberalized capital accounts, and control groups, i.e. country-years with 
capital controls
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Table 4 
Unconditional Matching, including Within-Country Observations 
 
  Nearest-Neighbor  Radius (<0.05)  by Strata 
Estimated effect of 
liberalization (percent) 




-2.2210  -1.9358 -2.0721 
No. of observations in 
the treatment group 
(No. of observations in 














Unconditional Matching: Across-Country Observations and Tighter Radius Parameter 
 
  Nearest-Neighbor Radius  (<0.05)  Radius(<0.01) 
Estimated effect of 
liberalization (percent) 




-2.0717  -2.9168 -3.8217 
No. of observations in 
the treatment group 
(No. of observations in 
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Table 6 
Regression-adjusted Matching  
 
  Nearest-Neighbor Radius (<0.05)  by Strata 
Estimated effect of 
liberalization (percent) 




-6.4192  -9.2622 -5.9428 
No. of observations in 
the treatment group 
(No. of observations in 








Note: Based on residuals from the currency crisis probit equation reported in Appendix B
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Table 7 
Robustness  
Unconditional Matching: Alternative Propensity Score Estimation  
 
  Nearest-Neighbor  Radius (<0.05)  By Strata 
Estimated effect of 
liberalization (percent) 




-6.1235 -2.2552 -2.1409 
No. of observations in 
the treatment group 
(No. of observations in 








  Note: Propensity score equation augmented to include dummy variables for currency crisis and capital 
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Probit Equations for Estimating Capital Account Liberalization Propensity Scores 
Explanatory Variable   (1)   (2) 
Current account/GDP t-1  0.72***  -0.16 
   (3.68)  (0.48) 
Govt. spending/GDP t-1  -1.46***  -1.27*** 
   (4.81)  (2.72) 
Openness  t   0.23**  0.12*** 
   (9.81)  (2.79) 
U.S. real interest rate  t-1  0.15**  0.01 
   (3.13)  (0.13) 
Total changes of government    2.75***  -0.19 
   (4.26)  (0.18) 
Freedom t-1  2.84  -5.72 
   (1.30)  (1.61) 
Currency crisis t-1    -4.96 
   (0.71) 
Capital Account Liberalization t-1    9.05*** 
   (48.01) 
No. of observations  1177  975 
Percent of liberalization observations 
correctly predicted (threshold=0.5)  10.7% 89.7% 
Percent of capital control observations 
correctly predicted (threshold=0.5)  98.2% 97.9% 
Log likelihood  -547.28 -137.45 
Pseudo-R2 0.20  0.77 
 
Note: The table reports the change in the probability of capital account liberalization in response to a 1 unit 
change in the variable evaluated at the mean of all variables (x 100, to convert into percentages) with 
associated z-statistic (for hypothesis of no effect) in parentheses below. Results significant at 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Constant included, but not reported. 
Observations are weighted by real GDP per capita (in dollars). 
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Appendix B 
Currency Crisis Equations for Generating Residuals  
Used in Regression-Adjusted Matching Procedure 
 
Explanatory Variable   
Log(M2/Reserves) t-1   1.6233 
  (1.22) 
Credit growth t-1   0.0291 
  (1.06) 
Current account/GDP t-1   -0.2976 
  (1.48) 
Real overvaluation t-1   0.2145 
  (4.07) 
Real GDP growth t-1   -0.4817 
  (1.88) 
No. of observations  751 
Adjusted R-square  0.04 
 
Note: Table reports the results (in percent) from a linear probit model, with associated standard errors in 
parenthesis. Only observations from the control group (with capital controls) are included, as in Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd (1997). 
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 Currency Crisis and Capital Account Liberalization Episodes 
 
Country  Currency Crisis Episodes  Capital Account Liberalization 
Episodes 
Argentina  1975, 1982, 1989  1993– 
Bangladesh 1975   
Belize   1981-85 
Bolivia  1981, 1983, 1988, 1991  1975-80, 1986-95 
Botswana 1984,  1996   
Brazil  1982, 1987, 1990, 1995   
Burundi  1976, 1983,1986, 1989, 1997   
Cameroon  1982, 1984, 1994   
Chile 1985  
China, P.R.: Hong Kong    1975– 
Columbia 1985   
Costa Rica  1981  1980-81, 1995– 
Cyprus    
Dominican Republic  1985, 1987, 1990   
Ecuador  1982, 1985, 1988  1975-85, 1988-92, 1995 
Egypt 1979,  1989   
El Salvador  1986, 1990  1996– 
Equatorial Guinea  1991, 1994   
Ethiopia 1992   
Fiji 1986   
Ghana  1978, 1983, 1986   
Grenada 1978   
Guatemala  1986, 1989  1975-79, 1989– 
Guinea-Bissau 1991,  1996   
Guyana 1987,  1989   
Haiti 1977,  1991   
Honduras 1990  1975-79,  1993-95 
Hungary 1989,  1994   
India  1976, 1991, 1995   
Indonesia  1978, 1983, 1986, 1997  1975-95 
Jamaica  1978, 1983, 1990  1996– 
Jordan  1983, 1987, 1989, 1992   
Kenya  1975, 1981, 1985, 1993, 1995, 1997  1996– 
  26Korea 1980,  1997   
Lao People’s D. R.  1995   
Madagascar  1984, 1986, 1991, 1994   
Malawi  1982, 1985, 1992, 1994   
Malaysia 1986,  1997  1975-95 
Mali 1993  
Malta 1992,  1997   
Mauritius 1979  1996– 
Mexico  1976, 1982, 1985, 1994  1975-81 
Morocco 1983,  1990   
Mozambique 1993,  1995   
Myanmar 1975,  1977   
Nepal  1975, 1981, 1984, 1991, 1995   
Nicaragua 1993  1975-77,  1996– 
Nigeria  1986, 1989, 1992   
Pakistan    
Panama   1975– 
Paraguay  1984, 1986, 1988, 1992  1982-83, 1996– 
Peru  1976, 1979, 1987   1978-83, 1993– 
Philippines  1983, 1986, 1997   
Romania 1990   
Sierra Leone  1988, 1990, 1997   
Singapore 1975  1978– 
South Africa  1975, 1978, 1984, 1996   
Sri Lanka  1977   
Swaziland  1975, 1979, 1982, 1984   
Syrian Arab Republic  1977, 1982, 1988   
Thailand  1981, 1984, 1997   
Trinidad & Tobago  1985, 1988, 1993  1994– 
Tunisia 1993   
Turkey 1978,  1994  1997– 
Uganda  1981, 1987, 1989  1997– 
Uruguay 1982  1978-92,  1996– 
Venezuela  1984, 1986, 1989, 1994  1975-83, 1996– 
Zambia 1985,  1994  1996– 
Zimbabwe  1982, 1991, 1994, 1997   
 
Notes: Currency crises defined by criteria described in text, with 24-month exclusion windows imposed. Blank cell indicates 
currency crisis never occurred or capital controls never implemented.  
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